If we think of childhood, as the infant researchers do, as a series of intersubjective moments or interaction sequences [with a caregiver], within each sequence the child brings a primary subjective experience [authentic sense of self, or “true self”], which is met by some response or initiative from the caregiver.

Over the course of each interactive sequence, the inner state [of authenticity] that the child started with is transformed by the interaction; and, through many repetitions of similar moments, the infant forms and internalizes representations of that transformational interaction sequence. Such presymbolic, internalized representations are thought to form the basis of psychological structure (e.g., Stern, 1985; Beebe, Lachmann, and Jaffe, 1997; Beebe and Lachmann, 1998).

What [Christopher] Bollas’ model would have us focus on, however, is the relationship between what the child learns and internalizes from these interaction sequences and the original subjective states [of authenticity] that the child brought to the inteactions in the first place. As I conceptualize the self, it is this intrapsychic relationship [between authenticity and our experiences of the responses of others] that determines the momentary quality of self-experience.

from Stern, S. (2002). The Self as a Relational Structure: A Dialogue with Multiple-Self Theory. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 12(5), 693–714.